If you have spent any time around aircraft, you know how a glass cockpit changed the feel of flying. The dials did not vanish overnight; they were replaced by screens, then by software updates, then by new habits. Something similar is happening quietly in the office behind the hangar, and it goes by the name IdentityOps. Let’s take a relaxed look at where the field stands today, what changed in the last couple of years, and what a flight-training organisation can take from it without hiring a security department.
First, an honest word about the label
The Ops Atlas, the reference I am leaning on here, is upfront that this is an emerging term. There is no founding document and no single agreed definition. Suppliers each draw the borders to suit their products. One camp talks about keeping a live sign-in platform healthy from morning to night; another sees a crossroads where access tooling, security work and automation meet; and inside a few companies the phrase is just what a department calls itself. So if a colleague defines it differently from you, you may both be right.
What the Atlas does is offer an editorial split that I find handy. IdentityOps concerns the existence of people and machines, plus the way each proves its claim. A neighbouring topic covers the rights attached to them, and another covers requesting and reviewing extra rights. The contrast resembles the difference between your licence being valid, the ratings printed on it, and the process of adding a new rating.
What the last few years brought
The Atlas collects a handful of dated milestones, and reading them in order tells a story.
- Password advice flipped. The US standards body’s digital identity guidelines, revised in mid-2025, favour long passwords (fifteen characters or above if the password is the only factor), no composition rules, no forced periodic changes and a blocklist of known-bad choices. If your school still makes everyone change a password every ninety days, that advice is now out of step.
- Phishing-resistant sign-in moved from nice-to-have to expected. The same guidelines require a phishing-resistant choice to be on offer at the middle assurance tier. The Atlas notes that only hardware-style methods based on FIDO2/WebAuthn and smart cards truly qualify, and that passkeys which sync across devices are left out of the highest tier because their keys can be exported.
- OAuth guidance got stricter. A security best-practice document published as RFC 9700 says the old implicit grant should not be used and the password grant must not be used. Plenty of home-grown tools still lean on exactly those shortcuts.
- Shared signals matured. An OpenID framework for systems to tell each other about risk events, such as a session being revoked, reached final status in September 2025.
- Token protection got attention. A US government interagency report on binding tokens to devices appeared in September 2026, reflecting worry about stolen session material.
- Machine identities got their own list. A community top-ten for non-human identities was published in 2025.
Notice the direction of travel: less emphasis on clever password rules, more on proving the device and person together, and on cleaning up the accounts that belong to software rather than people.
The trend I would watch most closely: sessions that outlive accounts
Here is the thing that surprised me most when I read the entry. Turning off a person’s account is not the same as ending their access. The Atlas states that access tokens commonly last an hour or so, and may run to more than a day under continuous-evaluation arrangements. One cloud provider’s revoke-sessions call may need several minutes before it bites, and another provider’s session revocation does not clear sessions inside the connected apps at all.
Translate that to the cockpit. Imagine a student whose training ended last week but whose electronic flight-bag login is still alive on a tablet in someone’s bag. The syllabus is closed, the instructor’s sign-off is on file, and yet the screen still opens. You do not need a scare story for this to matter; you simply need a routine that includes “kill the sessions” as a named step, not as a hopeful side effect.
What the incident write-ups have in common
The Atlas summarises several well-publicised intrusions between 2023 and 2025. I will not retell them blow by blow, but the shared pattern is worth stating in plain language. In each of them the attackers got in by defeating a human process rather than by breaking mathematics: a test environment that nobody had enrolled in a second factor, a service account whose credential was left in an ordinary file store, long-lived keys that no one had rotated for years, and help-desk resets granted to a convincing caller. The Atlas puts it bluntly: every cited incident defeated process, not cryptography.
That is oddly reassuring. Process can be improved by an ordinary organisation with a calendar and some discipline. You do not need to out-engineer a nation state; you need to make sure the unglamorous tasks actually happen.
Where small training organisations sit on the maturity ladder
The Atlas floats a five-rung maturity ladder of its own, loosely calibrated to the US government’s zero-trust maturity model. It runs from ad hoc, through centralised and automated, to governed, and finally continuous. A useful way to place yourself:
- Ad hoc: accounts are made and removed when somebody remembers.
- Centralised: the personnel feed is live and you measure how fast leavers are processed.
- Automated: at least nine in ten leavers are fully handled on time.
- Governed: most sign-ins use phishing-resistant methods and every machine account has an owner.
- Continuous: risk signals flow between systems, machine credentials are short-lived, and the leaver rate stays above 95 percent.
Most small organisations, honestly, sit at the first or second rung, and that is fine. The value of the ladder is that it tells you what to do next, rather than shaming you for where you are.
A trend that deserves a reality check: “MFA 100 percent”
Dashboards love to announce that every account has multi-factor sign-in. The Atlas is sceptical, and I agree. Its worked example compares coverage with usage: 1,190 of 1,400 people enrolled in a phishing-resistant method looks like 85 percent, but only about 66 percent of actual sign-ins used one, because the policy still allowed weaker options. The takeaway is to measure what people do, not what they could do. A pilot who owns a headset but flies without it is not equipped for the noise.
Likewise, counting text-message codes or tap-to-approve prompts as strong protection can paint a rosier picture than reality. The Atlas treats this as one of its named anti-patterns.
What I would do this quarter
If you run a training school, an aircraft-parts shop or a small charter outfit, here is a gentle, realistic list:
- Name one person as owner of the people-and-accounts routine, even if it is a few hours a month.
- Give your administrators hardware security keys first, then anyone with access to email, remote tools and money, then everyone else. That rollout order comes straight from the Atlas.
- Write down every machine account, with an owner, a purpose and an expiry date.
- Run a mock departure on a spare login and time how long every step takes.
- Put a recovery script by the phone so the help desk does not improvise.
If you want to read the complete picture, including the standards table and the metrics, the Atlas page on IdentityOps is the place to go. It is long, but it is organised so you can dip into one section at a time.
One more comparison from the flight line
Aviation already runs on the discipline that IdentityOps asks for. Every aircraft has a registration, an owner, a maintenance schedule and a retirement process; every pilot has a licence number, a medical status and a currency record. Nobody argues that this bookkeeping is glamorous, yet nobody would fly without it. The office systems behind a training school deserve the same respect, because the data inside them, from student records to payment details, is the school’s reputation in digital form.
Back to the flight line
Students who are still building their aviation knowledge may enjoy some practical ideas for studying weather as a student pilot, and anyone planning their next logbook milestones can browse a full walk-through of accumulating flight time. Both rely on the same underlying habit that good identity work does: keep a clean record and check it often.
The state of the field in one sentence? The industry is slowly moving from “did we set up accounts” to “can we prove, at any moment, who exists, by what means each one signs in, and what follows when somebody leaves.” Like the move to glass cockpits, nobody notices the change on a given day, and then one afternoon you look up and the old dials are gone.

