The operations manager at an invented flight-training outfit, call it Meridian Wing, kept a laminated card clipped inside the dispatch binder: two signatures required before an aircraft returns to service after major work. One mechanic does the job; a second inspects it. Nobody on the team found this strange. What did surprise them, one quiet Tuesday, was learning that their fleet of instructor laptops and student tablets had no such rule. A single administrator login could wipe every device in the school. None of these people exist, yet the lesson they stumble into sits at the centre of EndpointOps.
The Ops Atlas describes EndpointOps as an informal name for running laptops, tablets and phones through a full lifecycle, from first enrolment to retirement, at the point where device management meets security. Meridian Wing had been doing a version of this for years without calling it anything. They enrolled devices, set a few rules and trusted the console. Then a routine review turned up three uncomfortable findings.
Finding one: everyone was an administrator
The school’s IT contractor, a part-timer, held the broadest role in the management tenant and used it for everything, including reading the weekly report. The Atlas lists daily work under a top-level administrator as an anti-pattern for good reason: a phished password on that account hands an attacker the keys to every managed machine. The contractor was careful, but carefulness is not a control.
The fix at Meridian Wing was ordinary. They created narrower roles. Help-desk duties moved to an account that could reset a screen lock but not delete anything. Reporting moved to a read-only identity. The all-powerful account was reserved for rare, planned work. The Atlas also points out that several built-in directory roles, seven in all by its count, can read BitLocker recovery keys, so even a harmless-sounding role deserves a second look before anyone is handed it.
Finding two: a wipe needs no witness
The second discovery was the one that stung. Nothing stood between a stolen admin session and a bulk wipe. The Atlas devotes attention to a 2026 incident at a medical-technology company, where the firm reported a worldwide outage across its Microsoft estate, and within a week a federal cyber agency was recommending narrow admin roles, sign-in methods that resist phishing, and a second person to sign off before any wipe. It also notes that press accounts, which the company and Microsoft had not confirmed, described attackers creating a new top-level admin and then wiping devices through the management service.
Meridian Wing did not need to decide what exactly happened there. The point was structural. If one compromised account can trigger destruction, then the fleet’s safety depends on that account never being phished. Intune ships a feature named Multi Admin Approval, which holds destructive or sweeping changes (wipe, retire, delete, scripts, apps, policies, even role edits) until another person agrees. Setup hides a snag, and the Atlas flags it: the approvers belong in a security group that is linked to an Intune role, and only people placed directly in that group count, since a group nested inside it fails silently.
The team’s quality lead, a methodical person, insisted on testing it. A wipe request went in, sat pending, and only completed once the second approver signed off. She wrote a single line in the procedures binder: “No lone wipes.” It felt like home.
Finding three: the key nobody could find
The last finding concerned recovery keys. When a student’s tablet failed to boot after a firmware update, the instructor reached for the stored key and discovered that the device had been encrypted before its key was saved anywhere. The data on the tablet, chart annotations and scanned medical paperwork, was gone for good.
The Atlas puts the rule in a handful of words: escrow before you encrypt. Meridian Wing changed its enrolment script so that encryption could not start until the key had landed in the directory. They also scheduled a drill, a quarterly exercise in which someone fetched a key for a randomly chosen laptop and timed the retrieval, just as the school rehearses an engine-out procedure rather than assuming it will go well.
Why the drill matters
The Atlas revisits the July 2024 content-update fault that took down about 8.5 million Windows computers, according to a Microsoft estimate. Recovering them often needed BitLocker keys, and the advice circulating at the time amounted to “use your phone” to look them up. Fleets that could not find their keys quickly lost far more time than fleets that could. Meridian Wing had never lived through anything like it, but the story was enough to justify a stopwatch.
What changed after six months
The school did not buy anything new. It adjusted habits and tightened a few settings:
- Narrow roles for daily work, one rarely used top-level account.
- A second approver for wipe, retire and delete actions.
- Keys stored before encryption, and a timed retrieval drill each quarter.
- A weekly comparison of console data with the security tool’s own device list.
Staff reaction was mostly relief. Instructors disliked waiting for approvals at first, until one of them mistakenly queued the wrong group for a retire action and the approver caught it. The second signature had done exactly what it does on an aircraft work order.
Reading further, and staying grounded
Readers who want the maturity ladder and the 30-60-90 plan in the Atlas’s own words can open the EndpointOps entry in the Ops Atlas, a reference page that openly admits the label is informal.
For new students at a school like this one, the paperwork side of joining is worth a look too. A walk through what incoming flight students must hand over at admission shows what gets collected on day one, and the advice on weather revision for student pilots is the kind of material that ends up on those tablets. Everything a cadet saves there is worth the same care as a logbook.
Meridian Wing is invented, but its routine is not exotic: separate the roles, require a witness for destructive actions, save the keys first, and practise the recovery. If your school already respects the two-signature rule for aircraft, extending it to devices is a short step.

